Killing the Microphone: When Broadcast Freedom Should Yield to Genocide Prevention by Pauli, Carol
Texas A&M University School of Law
Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
2010
Killing the Microphone: When Broadcast Freedom
Should Yield to Genocide Prevention
Carol Pauli
Texas A&M University School of Law, carol.pauli@law.tamu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carol Pauli, Killing the Microphone: When Broadcast Freedom Should Yield to Genocide Prevention, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 665 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/372
ALABAMA LAW REVIEW
Volume 61 2010 Number 4
KILLING THE MICROPHONE: WHEN BROADCAST FREEDOM
SHOULD YIELD TO GENOCIDE PREVENTION
Carol Pauli*
ABSTRACT
When powerful radio broadcasts exhort listeners to kill their neigh-
bors, may outside nations or international organizations legally interrupt
the signals to prevent genocide? International law has no legal framework
for assessing and responding to such broadcasts. This Article attempts to
create one. The Article draws on empirical research in the field of com-
munication to identify conditions in which media messages become so po-
werful that they can mobilize audience members. Using this research, it
constructs a framework for determining when speech constitutes incitement
to genocide such that it loses any protection under international law and
perhaps even triggers an affirmative duty on the part of other states to
intervene. The proposed framework is unique. Unlike current definitions of
incitement to genocide, it is not concerned with convicting the criminal,
but aims entirely at preventing the crime. It is also unique in bringing this
interdisciplinary approach to this compelling goal.
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INTRODUCTION
As Radio-T616vision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM)l was orches-
trating the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the United States considered jam-
ming its broadcast signals but rejected this form of intervention,2 citing
"international telecommunications law and international conventions re-
garding the freedoms of information and expression." 3 The virulent broad-
casts continued to reach their listeners. In the space of approximately 100
1. Milles Collines, in French, means a thousand hills, a description of the Rwandan landscape.
2. For further accounts of the United States' decision, see SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM
FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 370-73 (New Republic 2002) and William A.
Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 MCGILL L.J. 141, 148 (2000).
3. Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 635 (1997). Metzl describes international law as a small, but significant reason
for inaction. Other motives were more pragmatic. Among declassified documents obtained by the
Washington Post under the Freedom of Information Act, a memo from May 5, 1994, records that
Defense Secretary William Perry and National Security Adviser Tony Lake discussed the possibility of
jamming, but that the Pentagon found it to be "ineffective and expensive," requiring $8,500 per hour
to operate a special airplane. Glenda Cooper, Memos Reveal Rwanda Delay; U.S. Had Early Notice of
Genocide; Pentagon Rejected Action, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2001, at A20.
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days, in a country of fewer than 8,000,000 people,4 an estimated 800,000
were killed.' RTLM is cited as having incited thousands of civilians with
no criminal histories to commit acts of unspeakable brutality.6
The agony' of Rwanda has prompted calls for a re-examination of the
legal arguments against international jamming of broadcast signals,' and
for a further development of international norms in order to clarify when
broadcast speech constitutes incitement to genocide such that it loses any
protection under international law9 and perhaps even triggers an affirma-
tive duty on the part of other states to intervene. 10 The current definition of
incitement to genocide does not aim at prevention. It aims at determining
culpability after the fact and, therefore, includes the element of specific
criminal intent. This is the same requirement that has kept the Internation-
al Criminal Court from including genocide in the charges against Sudan's
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, even while accusing him of issuing a
general call to Janjaweed militia to attack hundreds of thousands of civi-
lian members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups, systematically
subjecting them to rape, torture, and extermination. 12
Preventing genocide requires, not merely convicting the inciter, but
first-and more urgently-interrupting the incitement.13 The criteria for
one are not entirely suitable for the other. In convicting two leaders of
RTLM of incitement to commit genocide,14 the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR) laid out criteria determining when broadcast
speech may be punished," but some free speech advocates worry that
4. GtRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 264 (Columbia Univ.
Press 1995).
5. Id. at 265.
6. One man, imprisoned for the beating deaths of two six-year-olds, recalled, "Things were
strange. . . . Can you imagine the radio saying, 'Go kill these people'? The message got to the local
authorities. They mobilized the soldiers and the militias, and they were going to the villages getting
civilians to kill people. We accepted. They said we were fighting for the country." Alan Zarembo,
Judgment Day, HARPERS MAG., Apr. 1997, at 68, 70.
7. The use of the word agonies, in Ren6 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, Genocide, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE 508 (Israel W. Charny ed., 1999) helped as the author struggled for the
right word.
8. Metzl, supra note 3, at 636.
9. Eric Blinderman, International law and Information Intervention, in FORGING PEACE:
INTERVENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF MEDIA SPACE 104, 126 (Monroe E. Price
and Mark Thompson eds., 2002).
10. Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1101, 1103
(2005).
11. Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Sudan's Leader, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at A6.
12. Prosecutor v. Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009).
13. For examples of continuing uses of radio to incite ethnic killing see Crackles of Hatred: Radio
Propaganda, ECONOMIST, July 25, 2009, at 60.
14. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1 1033-34 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/ Judg&sent.pdf.
15. Recent Cases: International Law-Genocide-U.N. Tribunal Finds that Mass Media Hate
2010] 667
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these criteria, if used for the purpose of prevention, may weaken speech
protections in international law. 16 Misapplications already have occurred.
For example, in dozens of incidents, African leaders have pointed to the
ICTR convictions to justify their own restrictions on political opposition
speech."
Susan Benesch has enlisted the findings of genocide research to pro-
pose a six-prong "reasonably possible consequences" test to distinguish
incitement from mere hate speech that qualifies for protection." The test is
an improvement over the ICTR criteria, more tightly defining the crime,
and its elements overlap and support several that are also proposed here.
However, communication research points to additional factors that may
prove decisive in distinguishing prospectively whether a broadcast or other
mediated speech is dangerous enough to justify intervention.19 That con-
cern is especially pressing given assessments that disrupting the broadcasts
in Rwanda could have curbed the killing20 and that failing even to attempt
intervention sent a signal to Rwanda from the international community that
the genocide could proceed with impunity.21
Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 2769, 2773 (2004).
16. The fear is that the verdicts "could give ammunition to those who think press freedom has
gone too far. 'The currently fashionable phrase is "American exceptionalism,"' says Fred Schauer, a
Harvard law school professor. 'Many countries think the U.S. overstates the importance of free speech
and free press, and understates the importance of equality." Dina Temple-Raston, Journalism and
Genocide, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 18, 18-19.
17. See Joel Simon, Of Hate and Genocide, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 9, 9.
18. Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA. J.
INT'L L. 485, 519 (2008).
The following six-prong inquiry will aid in identifying the crime and distinguishing it from
hate speech: 1. Was the speech understood by the audience as a call to genocide? Did it use
language, explicit or coded, to justify and promote violence? 2. Did the speaker have au-
thority or influence over the audience and did the audience have the capacity to commit ge-
nocide? 3. Had the victims-to-be already suffered an outbreak of recent violence? 4. Were
contrasting views still available at the time of the speech? Was it still safe to express them
publicly? 5. Did the speaker describe the victims-to-be as subhuman, or accuse them of
plotting genocide? Had the audience been conditioned by the use of these techniques in oth-
er, previous speech? 6. Had the audience received similar messages before the speech?
Id. at 498.
19. See DENIS MCQUAIL, MEDIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND FREEDOM OF PUBLICATION 157 (2003)
("[W]e need to consider fairly carefully what purposes are served by trying to establish the responsi-
bility of the media for effects. Several non-exclusive possibilities can be indicated. One purpose is to
protect the public in a general way from various (consensually agreed) harms that have been attributed
to the media, especially those relating to violence, crime, and disorder. Here precautionary reasoning,
based on evidence of risk, plays a part.")
20. Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Lessons Learned, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/29/rw
anda8308.htm (last visited May 14, 2010) ("Silencing the radio broadcasts would not only have ended
this particularly effective form of incitement and the delivery of specific orders; it would also have
shown that the international community rejected the legitimacy of the genocidal message and those
who were delivering it.").
21. Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa from 1989 to 1993, told the Council on
Foreign relations that "[w]hat was happening in Rwanda was the type of development which would
have stopped very quickly if you just had people who were looking at them. One does not commit
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In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, Jamie Metzl, a former official
in the White House and also in the United Nations, 22 proposed that the
U.N. establish an independent information intervention unit responsible
for monitoring, countering and, "in extreme cases, jamming" broadcasts.2 3
Metzl's idea, quickly dubbed a "special United Nations 'jam squad,"' 24
was controversial in part because it did not define which messages might
be jammed,' and thus it risked being abused.26 This concern highlights the
need for a framework to accurately target incitement to genocide while
safeguarding the freedom of other speech.
This Article attempts to accomplish what the ICTR and others have
not. It proposes a framework, based on research in the field of communi-
cation, to determine when a message constitutes incitement to genocide so
as to justify international prior restraint through measures such as jamming
of broadcast signals. Part I will review the current criteria for punishing
genocide, which have come from past international incitement cases. Part
II will propose the framework, drawing on communication research. Part
III will use the proposed framework to analyze the cases that were cited as
precedents for the ICTR convictions. Part IV will apply the proposed
framework to the broadcasts of RTLM. Part V will apply the framework
to several hypothetical challenges. Part VI will explore the practical ques-
tion of how to apply the framework.
The proposed framework is unique in linking the compelling goal of
preventing genocide with ongoing empirical research in the field of com-
munication. It is not a test, with a fixed set of criteria, but rather a set of
factors to be examined. It is a structured inquiry, sufficiently open-ended
to incorporate new insights as research continues to discover the condi-
tions that make media messages exceptionally and dangerously powerful.
genocide against one's neighbor when you have somebody looking over your shoulder." Council on
Foreign Relations, Chester Crocker, Richard Moose, and Herman Cohen: Three Former Assistant
Secretaries of State for Africa on U.S. Policy Toward Africa, Meeting at the Council on Foreign
Relations, 19 (May 9, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.web.archive.org/web/20000823232044/http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/transcripts/t m
clean.html).
22. "Jamie Metzl has served as Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs on the US
National Security Council at the White House, as Senior Coordinator for International Public Informa-
tion at the US Department of State, and as a human rights officer for the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia." FORGING PEACE: INTERVENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF MEDIA SPACE 395 (Monroe E. Price & Mark Thompson eds., 2002).
23. Jamie Metzl, Information Intervention: When Switching Channels Isn't Enough, FOREIGN
AFF., November/December 1997, at 15, 17.
24. Jim Mann, National Perspective; U.N. Hate-Radio Jamming Would Send Wrong Signal, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at 5.
25. Id. (quoting the director of Radio Free Asia, Richard Richter, as expressing concern that
China would want to jam federally funded broadcasts into repressive Asian countries and saying,
"This opens up a Pandora's box, really.").
26. Editorial, Don't Spread Jamming, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 5, 1998, at 16 (warning
that "[tihere's too much risk that mission creep could occur."), available at
http://www.csmonitor.com /1998/0105/010598.edit.edit.2.htnil.
2010] 669
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Although this Article focuses on broadcast messages, the proposed frame-
work takes account of other channels of communication. In doing so, it
provides for targeted intervention decisions, distinguishing the impact of a
book from that of a bullhorn, for example. It takes account of the media
environment, encouraging a diversity of messages in countries that want to
avoid international intervention. It also recognizes the rapid expansion of
new communication technologies with new and different effects on au-
diences, and it invites research into their potential role in the context of
incitement.
I. DEFINING INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE
A. History
When the Nuremberg Tribunal heard the case of Julius Streicher, a
Nazi publisher of an anti-Semitic weekly, Der Stiirmer, there was no in-
ternational law against genocide or incitement to genocide. However, the
Nuremberg Tribunal "linked Streicher's propaganda with the war crimes
that had been carried out . . . to establish a parallel to the specific intent
requirement in criminal law," 27 and it convicted him of a Crime against
Humanity.
On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly closed
the legal gap and unanimously adopted the International Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,28 which was put in
force in 1951.29 It declares genocide to be "condemned by the civilized
world,"3 0 and it requires states to prevent genocide, whether they have
signed the convention or not.31 The Genocide Convention makes punisha-
ble not only genocide, but also conspiracy to commit genocide, attempt to
27. Metzl, supra note 3, at 636-37 (allowing, however, that this interpretation was disputed by
the Russian judge at Nuremberg and directing readers to JOHN B. WHITTON & ARTHUR LARSON,
PROPAGANDA TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WORDS 81 (1964)).
28. Genocide had been defined as "a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as
homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings." G.A. Res. 96 (I) (Dec. 11,
1946), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm (follow 96 (I) link).
29. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III)
(Dec. 9, 1948) (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) available at http://www.un.org/documents/instru
ments/docs en.asp?year= 1969 (follow A/RES/260 (III) link)
[hereinafter "Genocide Convention"]. The Genocide Convention defines "genocide" as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly trans-
ferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
30. Id.
31. Van Schaack, supra note 10, at 1112.
670 [Vol. 61:4:665
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commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and direct and public incitement
to commit genocide,32 which the Convention treats as the same as genocide
itself.33
B. The RILM Cases
The ICTR in 2003 convicted three media leaders of genocide, incite-
ment to genocide, and crimes against humanity.34 Two of these were lead-
ers of RTLM: Ferdinand Nahimana, an academic who founded the radio
station, and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a station executive.3 The ICTR
found that "RTLM broadcasts stereotyped Tutsi . . . as the enemy, pro-
moted contempt and hatred for them, and called on listeners to attack
them,"3 6 and it found a causal link between broadcasts of individual names
and the deaths of those individuals.37 Relying primarily on Nahimana, the
ICTR more recently convicted Rwandan singer and composer Simon Bi-
kindi of direct and public incitement to commit genocide38 for his use of a
public address system mounted on a truck39 to exhort Hutu along the road
to exterminate the minority Tutsi and to ask later if they had done so-if
they had killed the "snakes."40
The Nahimana verdict4 won praise from at least one international hu-
man rights scholar, who wrote that "the greatest conceptual breakthrough
of the case is its ruling that media committed genocide through instigating
it, with media leaders held accountable accordingly." 4 2 Gregory S. Gordon
32. Genocide Convention, supra note 29, art. 3(c).
33. Blinderman, supra note 9, at 120.
34. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1033-94 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement /mediatoc.pdf.
35. Nahimana was sentenced to 35 years in prison after his life sentence was reduced due to errors
that violated his procedural rights. Barayagwiza was sentenced to life in prison. Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze. Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
325, 327-28 (2004) (citing Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3,
2003)). The third media leader was Hassan Ngeze, founder, owner, and editor of the newspaper,
Kangura, who was also sentenced to life in prison. Id. On appeal, their sentences were reduced to 30,
32, and 35 years, respectively. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 99-
52-A, Appeals Judgment, 1052, 1097 & 1115 (Nov. 28, 2007), available at
http://ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Nahima na/decisions/071128judgement.pdf.
36. MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 326 (citing Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, at 486,
949).
37. Id.
38. Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi, Case No. ICTR 01-72-T, 423-24 (Dec. 2, 2008), available
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Bikindi/judgement/081202eJudgement.pdf.
39. Id. 422-23.
40. Id.
41. The Appeals Chamber later upheld the ICTR use of these hate-speech cases to derive broad
guidelines for interpreting and characterizing media discourse. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A,
Appeals Judgment at 1 695, available at http://ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Nahimana/decisions/071128j
udgement.pdf.
42. MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 329.
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found that the ICTR verdict contained four distinct criteria for the crime of
incitement to genocide, punishable under international law: "(1) purpose;
(2) text; (3) context; and (4) the relationship between speaker and sub-
ject." 43
II. PREDICTING INCITEMENT: A FRAMEWORK BASED ON
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
In convicting the RTLM leaders, the Tribunal for Rwanda recalled the
Nuremberg Tribunal, which had characterized Streicher's writing as a
poison "injected in to the minds of thousands of Germans which caused
them to follow the National Socialists' policy of Jewish persecution and
extermination. "44 This metaphor of the hypodermic needle is consistent
with early approaches to understanding the influence of propaganda, par-
ticularly following World War I.45 Communication, at that time, was seen
as a linear, unidirectional activity consisting of four elements: the source
of a message, the content of a message, the channel of communication
used to convey the message, and the audience.4 6 As it would later be
known, the "hypodermic needle," "magic bullet," "propaganda," or
"transmission" model assumed that media messages influenced an au-
dience uniformly and that the audience was passive. 47 For this reason,
research focused primarily on message content.48
However, this model has been overtaken in communication research49
by models that incorporate a wider variety of factorso that may weaken or
43. Gregory S. Gordon, "A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations": The ICTR
Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech, 45 VA. J. INT'L L.
139, 172 (2004) (adding that "[t]he first two criteria, purpose and text, are lumped together by the
Tribunal, but they should be considered separately").
44. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1 981 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/Judg& sent.pdf (quoting Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression, Opinion and Judgment (October 1, 1946), OFFICE OF THE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR
PROSECUTION OF Axls CRIMINALITY 56 (1947)).
45. See DENNIS MCQUAIL & SVEN WINDAHL, COMMUNICATION MODELS: FOR THE STUDY OF
MASS COMMUNICATIONS 7 (2d ed. 1993).
46. See id.
47. For a brief history and critique of this model, see ELIZABETH M. PERSE, MEDIA EFFECTS AND
SOCIETY 23-28 (2001) or W. Russell Neuman, Parallel Content Analysis: Old Paradigms and New
Proposals, in 2 PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND BEHAVIOR 205, 231-32 (George Comstock ed., 1989).
48. See Clay Calvert, Hate Speech and Its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective, 47 J. OF
COMM. 4, 10 (1997) ("The question of harm caused by hate speech, when considered from the pers-
pective of the transmission model, boils down to this: Did communication of a particular message, X,
cause a change, Y, in the attitude or behavior of the recipient of the message?").
49. PERSE, supra note 47, at 33 ("Certainly, few mass communication scholars still accept the
viability of these models, although the notion of a passive audience helplessly manipulated by enticing
media images still invades the writings of popular authors.").
50. For example, PERSE, supra note 47, at 23-52 classifies communication approaches into four
fundamental models. The "direct effects" model resembles the "hypodermic needle" approach but
focuses on the short-term, unconscious effects of such variables as camera angle or inage size in
672 [Vol. 61:4:665
2010] Killing the Microphone 673
strengthen the impact of a message. For example, a message is streng-
thened when the media environment is limited and competing messages are
weak or absent." A message may also gain long-term influence when it is
repeated over time5 2 and when it is echoed in a variety of media, thus im-
mersing the audience in its content.53 Even an audience that rejects such a
message will, at least, have its attention drawn to the subject matter.54
Messages in the mass media may have heightened influence in a politi-
cal context of instability." The perception of threat during large-scale so-
cial disruption has been seen to increase audience "dependency" on the
media as well as on interpersonal conversations, both strong predictors of
behavior change among audience members.56 The power of a message may
be increased by variables related to the audience itself, including its demo-
graphic characteristics,57  degree of selectivity, and level of sophistica-
tion.58 Relationships among social groups and individuals can magnify the
television. The "conditional effects" model underscores the audience members' ability to avoid or
reject media influence. The "cumulative effects" model, most applicable to repeated messages over
ubiquitous media channels, focuses on analyzing content and measuring media exposure. The "cogni-
tive-transactional model" looks at the way a media message may influence an audience member's
"schema," or mental organization of information. That, in turn, may influence the way the audience
member perceives the message or subsequent ones.
51. See id. at 109-12. Research on the "spiral of silence" has found media influence to multiply in
a kind of feedback loop: if the media marginalize an idea, then audience members feel more wary of
expressing it. As a result, the idea is less often heard and, therefore, is further marginalized.
52. Calvert, supra note 48, at 6, 11 (The "ritual model" of communication sees "a long-term,
cumulative harm that accrues with repeated use of racist epithets directed at targeted minorities....
The harm caused by hate speech that the ritual model points to is the production and maintenance of a
reality of subordination and discrimination.").
53. See PERSE, supra note 47, at 42-45 ("The effects of this model are generally reality-
construction effects. That is, through cumulative exposure, people begin to adopt the media's framing
as their own representation of reality."). See also, e.g., George Gerbner, Cultivation Analysis: An
Overview, 1 MASS COMM. & SOC'Y 175, 179 (1998) ("What is most likely to cultivate stable and
common conceptions of reality is [] the overall pattern of programming to which total communities are
regularly exposed over long periods of time.").
54. PERSE, supra note 47, at 43 (explaining that this phenomenon, termed "agenda setting," is
most often applied to the news media). "The effect is a fairly limited cognitive one: the news media
don't tell us what to think, but what to think about." Id. (citing BERNARD COHEN, THE PRESS AND
FOREIGN POLICY (1963)).
55. See PERSE, supra note 47, at 80-83.
56. Wilson Lowery, Media Dependency During a Large-Scale Social Disruption: The Case of
September 11, 7 MASS COMM. & SOC'Y 339 (2004).
57. See, for example, Gerbner, supra note 53, at 183, noting that, with respect to television,
"relationships between amount of viewing and the tendency to hold exaggerated perceptions of vi-
olence are . . . more pronounced within those real-world demographic subgroups (e.g., minorities)
whose fictional counterparts are relatively more frequently victimized on television." (citing Michael
Morgan, International Cultivation Analysis, in CULTIVATION ANALYSIS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN MEDIA
EFFECTS RESEARCH 225 (Nancy Signorielli & Michael Morgan eds., 1990)).
58. See, e.g., Maurice Vergeer et al., Exposure to Newspapers and Attitudes toward Ethnic Mi-
norities: A Longitudinal Analysis, 11 HOWARD J. OF COMM. 127, 140 (2000) (finding, in a study of
Dutch readers, that "people exposed to more than one newspaper perceive ethnic minorities as less
threatening than others do.... A possible explanation for this finding is that exposure to a larger
number of different opinions about ethnic minorities, as articulated in different newspapers, leads to a
more sophisticated attitude than does just being exposed to the messages of a single newspaper.").
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effect of a message.59 For example, a study conducted in Tanzania found
that radio messages were more likely to affect people's behavior if the
messages were later discussed in interpersonal conversations among in-
formal networks of audience members who shared the same gender, reli-
gion, and tribal membership.'o
The content of the classic genocide propaganda message dehumanizes
the target group and tries to justify killing.61 Its impact may be heightened
if the message is associated with enjoyment and if it is emotionally arous-
ing, seems realistic,62 offers characters that the audience can identify
with,63 or expands upon ideas that already enjoy sympathy among audience
members. Furthermore, different channels of mass communication affect
audiences in different ways. 65
Using communication research, it is possible to construct a framework
for determining when incitement to genocide warrants prior restraint
through such means as jamming broadcast signals. The proposed frame-
work would provide first for monitoring the external factors that can in-
tensify the power of media messages: (1) media environment, (2) political
context, and (3) characteristics of the audience. If these factors indicated
59. See PERSE, supra note 47, at 32-42. See also Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Reducing Intergroup
Prejudice and Conflict Using the Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 574 (2009) (finding that radio listeners changed their behavior as they changed in their
perception of social norms, even though their personal beliefs remained the same). But see Ervin Staub
& Laurie Anne Pearlman, Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict: A Commentary, 96 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 588 (2009) (arguing that radio does affect personal beliefs).
60. Shaheed Mohammed, Personal Communication Networks and the Effects of an Entertainment-
Education Radio Soap Opera in Tanzania, 6 J. OF HEALTH COMM. 137 (2001).
61. Benesch, supra note 18, at 503-06.
62. PERSE, supra note 47, at 30-33. What seems realistic to audience members, however, may be
influenced by their interaction with prior media messages. See, e.g., Gerbner, supra note 53, at 185
(explaining the "mean world syndrome," in which long-term, heavy television viewers tended to see
the world as mean and dangerous).
63. See PERSE, supra note 47, at 49.
64. Id. at 25-27. The ability of broadcast messages to reinforce the pre-existing beliefs and atti-
tudes among audience members was acknowledged in research funded by American media industries
in the 1940s to 1960s, which found that the media had minimal effects otherwise. See also L.J.
Shrum, The Relationship of Television Viewing with Attitude Strength and Extremity: Implications for
the Cultivation Effect, 1 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 3, 17 (1999) (supporting a hypothesis that television view-
ing influences audience attitudes by reinforcing and updating audience beliefs), and JACQUES ELLUL,
PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATTITUDES 36 (1965) (observing that "propaganda cannot
create something out of nothing. It must attach itself to a feeling, an idea; it must build on a foundation
already present in the individual.").
65. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 326 (Rout-
ledge Classics 2001) (1964) (writing that "TV is a cool medium. It rejects hot figures and hot issues
.... Had TV occurred on a large scale during Hitler's reign he would have vanished quickly....
Radio, however, is a hot medium and takes cartoon characters seriously."); see also ELLUL, supra
note 64, at 10 ("A movie does not play on the same motives, does not produce the same feelings, does
not provoke the same reactions as a newspaper.... A word spoken on the radio is not the same, does
not produce the same effect, does not have the same impact as the identical word spoken in private
conversation or in a public speech before a large crowd."). See generally WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY
AND LITERACY: THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORLD (Methuen 1982) (contrasting written against
oral culture and communication).
674
Killing the Microphone
an environment in which messages would have exceptional power to
change behavior on a large scale, then the framework would examine the
messages themselves for the three operative "hypodermic needle" factors:
(4) authority of the source of the message, (5) content of the message, and
(6) channel of communication.66 Additionally, the framework would take
account of one more factor, (7) evidence of an overt act, bridging the gap
between words and actions, such as organizing, arming, or otherwise pre-
paring for violence against a targeted group.
The framework that this Article proposes differs from earlier ap-
proaches in several ways. It refines and clarifies the ICTR examination of
"context," dividing it into two categories-media environment and politi-
cal context-both separate from the content of the message .67 By looking
separately at the media environment, the framework encourages the inter-
national community to pay special attention to governments that limit the
diversity of views in the media. For this reason, leaders cracking down on
political opposition voices would no longer find a pretext for their actions
in incitement law, but instead would find their own messages subjected to
the glare of heightened international scrutiny. The framework also ad-
dresses political context, treating political instability as a separate warning
sign because it heightens audience dependence on media messages.68 In
addition, the proposed framework invites an assessment of the characteris-
tics of the audience as part of its analysis. International intervention would
be more strongly indicated where an inflammatory message was dissemi-
nated to an unsophisticated audience or one that consists of a network with
a strong ethnic or religious identity.
Unlike earlier approaches, the proposed framework includes an ex-
amination of the channel of communication. Communication technologies
differ in their impact on audiences. By taking the channel of communica-
tion into account, the framework allows for distinctions. It also invites
continuing research into the impact of new technologies, including Internet
66. See MCQUAIL & WINDAHL, supra note 45.
67. The precedent cases have used "context" to refer to a number of distinctly different features of
communication, including the pre-existing attitudes of an audience that might see Holocaust denial as
an excuse for anti-Semitism, the external political reality of ongoing massacres, and the relative
strength or weakness of the chosen channel of communication. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 1004-06 (Dec. 3,
2003), available athttp://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/Judg&sent.pdf.
68. The danger of high media dependency might also be found where an audience is forced to
listen to broadcasts, as has been reported in Pakistan. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Pir Zubair
Shah, In Pakistan, Radio Amplifies Terror of Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at Al:
Every night around 8 o'clock, the terrified residents of Swat ... crowd around their ra-
dios. They know that failure to listen and learn might lead to a lashing-or a beheading.
Using a portable radio transmitter, a local Taliban leader . . . reveals names of people the
Taliban have recently killed for violating their decrees-and those they plan to kill.
"They control everything through the radio," said one Swat resident, who declined to give
his name for fear the Taliban might kill him. "Everyone waits for the broadcast."
Id.
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sites, mobile telephones, and text messages. 69 Finally, because the frame-
work focuses on prevention rather than culpability, it does not require
violence already to have begun against a target population nor does it in-
clude the criminal element of purpose or intent.
The framework incorporates several features of other approaches. It
includes two of the "hypodermic needle" factors that were also used by
the ICTR: the relationship of the speaker to the audience and the content
or "text" of the message. In the latter category, the ICTR specified that
"speech constituting ethnic hatred results from the stereotyping of ethnici-
ty combined with its denigration" 0 followed by the targeting of victims
based on ethnicity alone.71 However, as the RTLM broadcasts illustrated,
incitements to genocide have even more specific hallmarks, which can
serve to flag the most dangerous content.72 Before justifying intervention,
the proposed framework requires the presence of an overt act73 such as
organizing or otherwise equipping audience members "to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.""
Use of the framework would provide a way to target jamming careful-
ly, limiting it not only to a particular kind message by a particular kind of
speaker, but also to a specific channel of communication in a particular,
restrictive media environment at a particular, volatile time in the political
life of a particular, susceptible audience while hostile overt acts were also
present. Furthermore, use of the framework would allow for less extreme
media interventions. If neighboring states or international agencies were
able to broadcast effective anti-incitement messages into a country, for
69. See Kevin Sullivan, In War-Torn Congo, Going Wireless to Reach Home, WASH. POST, July
9, 2006, at Al (reporting that armed rebel groups were said to use cell phones and text messages to
coordinate operations in eastern Congo); Scott Baldauf, Freedom of Speech Suffers in Tense Ethiopia,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 13, 2006, at 4 (reporting the use of text messages in Ethiopia to urge
attacks on ethnic Tigreans).
70. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, at 1 1021, available at
http://ww w.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/Judg&sent.pdf
71. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Summary, at 195, available at http://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/judgement/Summary-Media.pdf
72. Benesch, supra note 18 (noting that past incitements to genocide have included media messag-
es portraying the target group as subhuman and falsely accusing it of plotting to exterminate the au-
diences).
73. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, at 1 952, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/Judg&sent.pdf ("The nature of media is such
that causation of killing and other acts of genocide will necessarily be effected by an immediately
proximate cause in addition to the communication itself.").
74. Genocide Convention, supra note 29. Under the proposed framework, it would not be neces-
sary that an inciter share an organizer's intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
For example, a commercial radio station might simply find it highly profitable to broadcast incitements
against a target group at the same time that others were organizing to attack that group. The frame-
work could justify disrupting the broadcasts even though the station's indifference to the fate of the
target group presumably would frustrate a later genocide prosecution.
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example, their efforts might shift the "media environment" analysis
enough to obviate the need for jamming.7 5
The factors used in this proposed framework have emerged from dif-
fering models of communication; however, the models do not oppose, but
overlap and augment each other.7 6 As will be seen, in addition to structur-
ing an analysis of threatening messages in the future, the framework also
offers a systematic way to view the reasoning about incitement that under-
lies the precedent cases cited by ICTR.
III. USING THE FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE THE PRECEDENT CASES
In convicting the radio leaders in Rwanda, the ICTR was guided pri-
marily by three cases from the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) and six cases from the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in which communication media had been implicated in incitement
to violence and incitement to discrimination, so that the fundamental right
of freedom of expression had to be balanced in the appeals.77
In the UNHRC cases, appeals from national court decisions were
brought under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR), which provides that "[e]veryone shall have the right
to freedom of expression,"" but which also notes that this right may be
limited in order to serve such goals as protecting the rights of others, pub-
lic order, or public health.79
The ECHR cases were brought under Article 10 of the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
which provides that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression"8o
but which also notes that there are "duties and responsibilities"s" in the
exercise of that freedom.
In applying either the European Convention on Human Rights or
ICCPR, courts use a three-part test, which asks whether the government
75. See Gordon, supra note 43, at 146 (pointing out that international law requires interventions in
speech to be "proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued").
76. PERSE, supra note 47, at 52 ("The most complete explanations for media effects are those that
combine explanations from each model.").
77. As the ICTR noted, there was only one direct precedent for the crime of direct and public
incitement to genocide: the ICTR's own 1998 conviction of Jean Paul Akayesu, a mayor whose
speeches had urged crowds to kill Tutsi.
78. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19 (2), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 2 embraces mediated speech. It continues: "this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice."
79. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, at 1 984, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/Judg&sent.pdf (citing ICCPR, supra note 78,
at art. 19(3)).
80. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10(1), Sept.
3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
81. Id. art. 10(2).
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restriction on speech is prescribed by law, serves a legitimate purpose, and
is "necessary" in a democratic society.82 All of the precedent cases turned
on the last question, requiring courts to balance the value of free speech
against incitement to racial hatred or violence.
In all three of its cases, the UNHRC supported the government restric-
tions on speech.83 In Ross v. Canada, a schoolteacher had been re-assigned
to nonclassroom work84 due to his off-duty anti-Semitic remarks and pub-
lications." The UNHRC upheld the restrictions on him, pointing to a
causal link between the teacher's statements and a "poisoned" atmosphere
in the school.86 In J.R. T. and the W. G. Party v. Canada, the UNHRC
refused to hear a case that arose when Canada barred public telephone
service and handed a one-year prison sentence to a Toronto man who re-
peatedly used recorded messages to warn those who dialed in that "inter-
national Jewry" would lead the world into wars and moral and economic
collapse." In Faurisson v. France, the UNHRC upheld the conviction and
fine imposed against a literature professor who told a monthly magazine
that he had "excellent reasons not to believe" in the existence of "magic
gas chambers" for extermination purposes at Nazi concentration camps."
In its six cited precedent cases, the ECHR both upheld and overturned
government restrictions on speech. In Jersild v. Denmark, the ECHR
overturned the conviction, under Danish law, of a television journalist
whose Sunday News Magazine had broadcast several minutes' worth of
interviews with members of a racist youth group.89 In Incal v. Turkey, the
ECHR unanimously overturned the conviction of a Turkish lawyer90 who
had been sentenced to more than six months in prison91 because of his role
in publishing an opposition party leaflet that had been barred as inciting
hatred and hostility through racist words.' In Arslan v. Turkey, the ECHR
82. Gordon, supra note 43, at 146.
83. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, at 986-89, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/Judg&sent.pdf.
84. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 736/1997: Canada
(Jurisprudence) 1 2.1, U.N Docs. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000) (Ross v. Canada).
85. Id. 11.5.
86. Id. 11.6.
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 104/1981: Canada
(Jurisprudence), U.N Docs. CCPR/C/18/D/104/1981 (J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada) (declared
inadmissible Apr. 6, 1983).
88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, Communica-
tion No. 550/1993: Faurisson v. France, 1 9.5., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (November 8,
1996) (submitted by Robert Faurisson).
89. Jersild v. Denmark, App. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994) available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe
.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Jersild v. Denmark in "Case Title" field).
90. Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 84 (1998), available at
http://cmiskp.echr. coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Incal v. Turkey in "Case Title"
field).
91. Id. 16.
92. Id.
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overturned the conviction of a journalist who had been sentenced to more
than a year in prison93 because his prizewinning94 book, History in Mourn-
ing, 33 bullets,95 had called the Turks invaders who had massacred pea-
sants and who had intended to exterminate the Kurds.96 In Siirek and
Ozdemir v. Turkey, the ECHR overturned the convictions of the editor and
the major shareholder in a weekly newspaper, the Truth of News and
Comments,97 which had published an interview with an opposition leader98
of the Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK, an illegal organization.99 In a
companion case, Siirek v. Turkey (No.1), however, the Court upheld a
conviction of the same publication for printing volatile letters to the edi-
tor."'o In Zana v. Turkey, the Court upheld the conviction of a former
mayor, already serving several sentences in a military prison,"o' who told
journalists that "[a]nyone can make mistakes, and the PKK kill women
and children by mistake."1 02
The proposed framework provides a systematic way to consider the
factors taken into account when these international bodies balanced media
freedom against speech posing a danger of violence and discrimination.
The framework offers further refinement and development of those fac-
tors.
A. Media Environment
The proposed framework begins by considering the media environ-
ment of a potentially dangerous message. Signs of a coercive media envi-
ronment include an absence of competing messages and the frequent repe-
tition of a message so that it fills the airwaves or is echoed across different
media platforms. Using the framework to analyze the precedent cases re-
veals that, although the media environment was not explicitly identified as
a factor, it did play a role in several decisions in which the ECHR recog-
93. Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 23462/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 19 (2001), available at
http://cmiskp.echr. coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Arslan v. Turkey in "Case
Title" field, follow first result).
94. Id. 8.
95. Id.
96. Id. 10.
97. Sirek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (1999),
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Stirek and Ozdemir
v. Turkey in "Case Title" field).
98. Id. 9.
99. Id.
100. Sirek v. Turkey (No. 1), App. 26682/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Sirek v. Turkey in "Case Title"
field, follow "CASE OF SUREK v. TURKEY (No. 1)" (second result)).
101. Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Zana v. Turkey in "Case Title"
field, follow first result).
102. Id. 12.
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nized the importance of diverse viewpoints as a protection against incite-
ment. In Jersild, the Court overturned the fine that Denmark imposed on a
television journalist, in part, because of the "context in which [his pro-
gram] was broadcast."103 Despite the Danish station's broadcast monopoly,
the ECHR tacitly relied on viewers' access to diverse sources of news, as
it indicated confidence in the "well-informed audience." 10 4 The ECHR also
noted the journalistic context of the youth group interview, as it described
the weekly television news magazine as a "serious television programme
... dealing with a wide range of social and political issues."105
In three of the Turkish cases, the ECHR supported those who were
promoting a diversity of views in the media environment, repeating a for-
mula favoring out-of-power voices over the official ones, stating that the
"limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government
than in relation to a private citizen or even a politician." 106 In Incal, the
ECHR upheld publication of the opposition party leaflet, which com-
plained of government hostility towards citizens of Kurdish origin.1o Al-
though the government argued that the leaflet was likely to incite an anti-
government reaction by Kurdish people, 108 the ECHR supported the free
speech rights of the government opponent. 109 In Arslan, the ECHR upheld
the publication of a book describing Turkey as an aggressor against
Kurds.110 In Siirek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, the ECHR upheld the right of
the weekly review to publish an interview with the leader of the PKK, and
it warned states not to use such concerns as national security or the pre-
vention of disorder to restrict the right of the public to be informed.'
Overall, the precedent decisions refer only obliquely to the media envi-
ronment, a key factor in the proposed framework, but concern for a diver-
sity of views runs through several of the decisions and is a unifying factor
among them.
B. Political Context
The proposed framework considers separately the political context in
which a message is sent because political instability heightens audience
dependence on the communication media and, in that way, strengthens the
influence of messages on audience members. Only one of the precedent
103. Jersild v. Denmark, App. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. 31 (1994).
104. Id. 34.
105. Id. 9.
106. Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 54 (2000).
107. Id. 50.
108. Id. 44.
109. Id. 46 (noting that "interferences with the freedom of expression of a politician who is a
member of an opposition party, like the applicant, call for the closest scrutiny on the Court's part").
110. Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 23462/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 50 (2001).
111. Sirek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, App. 23927/94 and 24277/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (1999).
680 [Vol. 61:4:665
Killing the Microphone
decisions approached this rationale. In Jersild, dissenters in the 12-7 deci-
sion would have upheld sanctions against the Danish television reporter
because "[1]arge numbers of young people today, and even of the popula-
tion at large, finding themselves overwhelmed by the difficulties of life,
unemployment and poverty, are only too willing to seek scapegoats who
are held up to them." 112
When political instability played a role in other decisions, the reason-
ing appeared to be, not that audience members relied more on the messag-
es, but that the political context lowered any practical barriers to audience
members acting on those messages. In upholding convictions by Turkey's
National Security Court in Zana and in Silrek (No.1), the ECHR noted that
volatile remarks had been made in southeast Turkey, an area under wide-
spread emergency rule in an "already explosive situation,"113 which had
claimed the lives of more than 7,000 people. These same conditions were
noted in Silrek and Ozdemir v. Turkey. Although the ECHR found that the
remarks in question were not sufficient to justify a conviction by the Istan-
bul National Security Court, 114 a concurring opinion by five judges sought
to put more emphasis on "context" in future cases, to assess whether there
was "a real and genuine risk" that specific words might actually inflame
or incite to violence." Dissenting judges did emphasize political context,
finding that the interview in question could encourage further violence
especially given "the sensitivity of the political and security situation in
south-east Turkey." 116
The proposed framework explicitly takes account of political instabili-
ty, viewing it as a separate kind of context that can lend power to messag-
es. The framework would take up separately the overt acts that bridge the
gap between messages and violence.
112. Jersild v. Denmark, App. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995) (joint dissenting opinion of judges
Gilcikdl, Russo, and Valticos).
113. Zana v. Turkey, App. 18954/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (1999). "[T]he interview coincided with
murderous attacks carried out by the PKK on civilians in south-east Turkey, where there was extreme
tension at the material time." Id. 60; Surek v. Turkey (No. 1), App. 26682/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 62
(1999) ("[S]erious disturbances have raged between the security forces and the members of the PKK
involving a very heavy loss of life.").
114. Surek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, App. 23927/94 and 24277/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (1999).
115. Id. (joint concurring opinion of judges Palm, Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall, and Greve).
The judges called for "a measured assessment of the many different layers that compose the general
context." The layers suggested are all addressed separately by the proposed framework: the language
of the message, the authority of the speaker, the prominence of the publication (the "channel of com-
munication" in the framework) and the proximity of the message to the center of violence (a measure
of "political context" in the proposed framework).
116. Id. (joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Wildhaber, KOris, Strdfznickd, Baka, and Traja).
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C. Characteristics of the Audience
The impact of a message may be stronger where the audience is young
or unsophisticated, already inclined toward prejudiced views or highly
networked along such lines as tribal membership and religion.
In Ross v. Canada, the UNHRC held that the "duties and responsibili-
ties" that accompany freedom of speech, under Article 19 of the ICCPR1
have "particular relevance within the school system, especially with regard
to the teaching of young students."' Although the ECHR decisions did
not systematically address the characteristics of the audience as a criterion,
such factors nonetheless played a role in several of its decisions. In
upholding a Turkish conviction in Siirek (No.1), the Court pointed to the
"embedded prejudices" which already existed in the audience and which
might be hardened by exposure to angry, published letters from fellow
newspaper readers.1 19 By contrast, in overturning the conviction of the
Danish television journalist in Jersild, the ECHR majority accepted the
television journalist's explanation that broadcasting the racist statements
held them up to ridicule so as "to counter them through exposure." 120 Dis-
senters in Jersild differed on the question of audience characteristics. One
group warned that "[n]obody can exclude that certain parts of the public
found in the television spot support for their racist prejudices. "121 While
the early hypodermic-needle theory of communication saw audiences as
passive and uniform, the proposed framework, based in more recent re-
search, recognizes that audience members differ in their responses to mes-
sages.
D. Authority of the Source
Where the three externally observable factors-media environment,
political context, and audience characteristics-indicate conditions ripe for
incitement to genocide, the proposed framework examines the classic "hy-
podermic needle" factors. The first consideration is the authority of the
source. This was a key concern, also, in the ICTR precedent cases.
117. ICCPR, art. 19 (3) provides in part:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or
reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
Id.
118. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 736/1997: Canada
(Jurisprudence), 1 11.6, U.N. Docs. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000) (Ross v. Canada).
119. Sirek v. Turkey (No. 1), App. 26682/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 62 (1999).
120. Jersild v. Denmark, App. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. 28 (1995).
121. Id. (joint dissenting opinion of Ryssdal, Bernhardt, Spielmann, and Loizou).
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Where the source of a volatile statement was a person of authority in
the eyes of the audience, the ECHR was more willing than otherwise to
restrict speech as dangerous. In upholding a conviction in Zana, the Court
pointed out that the prisoner who warned of the potential for inadvertent
killing of women and children was not merely a supporter of the opposi-
tion party, PKK,122 but also a person of influence, "the former mayor of
Diyarbakir, the most important city in south-east Turkey." 123
In Ross v. Canada, the UNHRC emphasized the authority of a teacher
in the context of the school system, 124 and the danger of lending the legi-
timacy of the school system to discriminatory views. 125
Where inflammatory views were not endorsed by an authoritative
speaker, the ECHR either overturned the conviction or explained that the
restriction on speech was compelling due to other factors. In Jersild, the
ECHR pointed out that the television program disassociated itself from the
racist remarks of the interviewees, 12 6 thereby not lending its authority to
the offensive messages. In Silrek v. Turkey (No.1), Stirek was convicted
for publishing two angry letters from readers of his weekly review. 127 Al-
though, like the journalist in Jersild, he did not personally associate him-
self with the readers' views against the military actions of Turkish authori-
ties, the ECHR pointed to other reasons to uphold his conviction, primari-
ly the volatility of the audience and the force of the content of the letters.
In Incal and in Arslan, the voices were not those of powerful authorities.
E. Content of the Message
As the primary hypodermic needle factor, the content (or the "text")
of the message was the focus of the ICTR cases and also its cited prece-
dents. In upholding a conviction in Siirek (No. 1), the ECHR noted the
pointed content of published readers' letters. It said that the letters at-
tempted to appeal to base emotions and to stigmatize authorities by using
such words as "massacres" and labels such as "the fascist Turkish army,"
communicating to the reader that "recourse to violence is a necessary and
justified measure. 128 One of the letters identified individuals by name to
122. Zana v. Turkey, App. 18954/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (1999).
123. Id. 60.
124. Canada's Supreme Court had put it even more pointedly, stating that "[t]eachers occupy
positions of trust and confidence, and exert considerable influence over their students as a result of
their positions." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 736/1997:
Canada (Jurisprudence) 1 4.7, U.N Docs. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000) (Ross v. Canada).
125. Id. 11.6.
126. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1993 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/
Judg&sent.pdf.
127. Sirek v. Turkey (No. 1), App. 26682/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
128. Id. 62.
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be targets of violence. 129 That message was similar to the one in Zana,
where the mention of "mistakes" that might kill women and children was
also seen as a threat. 130
Where the content of a volatile message consisted of accurate informa-
tion, however, the ECHR supported publication. In Sirek and Ozdenir,
the publication of an interview with a PKK leader was upheld as having
"newsworthy content." Although the publication included such comments
as, "The war will go on until there is only one single individual left on our
side," the ECHR credited the publication with giving the public insight
into the conflict and into the personalities of opposition leaders. 13 1 in In-
cal, the Court upholding the opposition party leaflet noted that its relevant
passages depicted "actual events. "132 It found that, despite "virulent re-
marks" 133 about the Turkish government, the leaflets called for nothing
more than the establishment of "neighbourhood committees. "134 It found
no evidence that this language had any hidden meaning. 13 5
Content that the UNHRC judged not to deserve protection consisted of
threats, accusations, and assertions contrary to historic fact. In J.R. T. and
the W. G. Party v. Canada, the messages dialed up via public telephone
warned "of the dangers of international Jewry leading the world into wars,
unemployment and inflation and the collapse of world values and prin-
ciples. "136 The UNHRC found, in fact, that Canada had an obligation un-
der Article 20(2) of the ICCPR to prohibit the speech as advocacy of ra-
cial or religious hatred. 137 In Ross v. Canada, the disciplined school teach-
er had "call[ed] upon true Christians . . . to hold those of the Jewish faith
and ancestry in contempt as undermining freedom, democracy and Chris-
tian beliefs and values. "138 The provincial board of inquiry, which initially
heard the case, stated that "Ross continuously alleges that the Christian
faith and way of life are under attack by an international conspiracy in
which the leaders of Jewry are prominent. "139 The UNHRC concluded that
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Sirek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 61
(1999), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Stirek and
Ozdemir v. Turkey in "Case Title" field).
132. Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. 50 (1998), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Incal v. Turkey in "Case Title"
field).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. 51.
136. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1987 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm (follow "Cases" link,
follow "Status of Cases" link, and follow "NAHIMANA, Ferdinand (ICTR-96-11)" link).
137. Id.
138. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 736/1997: Canada
(Jurisprudence), 1 4.2, U.N. Docs. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (Ross v. Canada) (Oct. 18, 2000).
139. Id.
684 [Vol. 61:4:665
Killing the Microphone
Ross called on Christians "to hold those of the Jewish faith and ancestry in
contempt."140 In Faurisson v. France, the publication doubted the exis-
tence of gas chambers for extermination at Nazi concentration camps. 14 1 In
assessing the content of the message, the UNHRC paid attention not only
to words but also to tone. In Faurisson, the French government had noted
cynical references, such as one to a "magic gas chamber." 142 Such lan-
guage, it said, "incites .. . readers to anti-semitic behaviour. 143 A con-
curring opinion noted that, in some cases, "those interested in spreading
hostility and hatred adopt sophisticated forms of speech that are not pu-
nishable under the law against racial incitement, even though their effect
may be as pernicious as explicit incitement, if not more so."144
In Jersild, by contrast, the ECHR took into account that the television
program in question was a "serious" one and presumably, therefore, less
volatile in tone. 145 These ICTR precedent cases appear to have expanded
the definition of "text" to include the additional persuasive factor of tone.
This is a legitimate consideration given research findings that factors such
as emotionality and realism in the content of a message may heighten its
force.
One exception to the pattern above occurred in Arslan. The Court ac-
knowledged that the book was not a neutral history, and it noted "the un-
deniable virulence of the style. "146 It also acknowledged a troublesome
political context in the wake of the Gulf War when a large number of
Kurds "were thronging at the Turkish border. "147 In overturning Arslan's
conviction, however, the ECHR pointed to an important distinguishing
factor, which the proposed framework calls the "channel of communica-
tion."
F. Channel of Communication
A channel of communication may be anything from a book or newspa-
per to a radio or television broadcast. Although this factor has a place in
140. Id.
141. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 550/1993: France
(Jurisprudence), U.N Docs. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (Robert Faurisson v. France) (Nov. 8, 1996)
[hereinafter Communication No. 550/1993].
142. Id. 2.6.
143. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1988 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/
Judg&sent.pdf.
144. Communication No. 550/1993 (Individual opinion by Elizabeth Evatt and David Kretzmer,
cosigned by Eckart Klein, 1 4).
145. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T 1 992.
146. Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 23462/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 45 (2001), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Arslan v. Turkey in "Case Title"
field, follow first result).
147. Id. 47.
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the classic "hypodermic needle" model, it was articulated as a considera-
tion in only two of the precedent cases cited by the ICTR. In Arslan, the
Court was more forgiving toward a book than it apparently would have
been toward other channels of communication. It found a literary work to
be less likely than the mass media (presumably meaning the broadcast
media) to disturb national security and public order. In this case, the Court
overturned speech restrictions placed on a book that painted a negative
picture of Turks and their treatment of Kurds.148 In Zana, the ECHR noted
that it was a major national daily newspaper that carried the volatile state-
ment at issue.149 The resulting prominence of the statement was a factor as
the Court upheld the speaker's conviction.
Different channels of communication have different capabilities and
limitations. They engage audiences in different ways. Still, courts examin-
ing restrictions on speech have paid little attention to the implications of
these differences. The proposed framework would require examining this
factor separately when evaluating potential incitements to genocide.
G. Overt Act
Since speech does no physical harm, the ICTR convictions required a
finding of an additional proximate cause in order to link incitements to
genocide."5 o In the precedent cases, the ECHR upheld convictions where
violence against a target group was ongoing. Where such violence was
speculative or sporadic, the ECHR upheld the speech instead. In upholding
a conviction in Siirek (No.1), the ECHR noted that audience prejudices
already had "manifested themselves in deadly violence."15 1 In Zana, the
Court noted that the remarks of the former mayor "coincided with mur-
derous attacks carried out by the PKK on civilians in south-east Tur-
key. "152
In the school setting that was the basis of Ross v. Canada, the
UNHRC found that the teacher's statements contributed to a "poisoned
atmosphere" in the school. 153 Witnesses had given evidence of "repeated
148. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T 1 996.
149. Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 18954/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. 60 (1997), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Zana v. Turkey in "Case Title"
field, follow first result).
150. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T 1 952. ("The nature of media is such that causation of
killing and other acts of genocide will necessarily be effected by an immediately proximate cause in
addition to the communication itself").
151. Stirek v. Turkey (No. 1), App. 26682/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 62 (1999), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Stirek v. Turkey in "Case Title"
field, follow "CASE OF SUREK v. TURKEY (No. 1)" (second result)).
152. Zana, App. No. 18954/91 1 59.
153. Human Rights Comm., on International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communica-
tion No. 736/1997: Canada (Jurisprudence), 1 11.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000) (Ross
v. Canada).
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and continual harassment in the form of derogatory name calling of Jewish
students, carving of swastikas into desks of Jewish children, drawing of
swastikas on blackboards and general intimidation of Jewish students." 154
By contrast, in Incal, upholding an antigovernment leaflet urging
Kurds to band together politically, the Court explained that it found no
evidence of "any concrete action which might belie" the authors' stated
intent only to criticize official discrimination.155 In Jersild, even the dis-
senters acknowledged that there was "no evidence that the statements in
question provoked any acts of racist persecution." 15 6 Establishing a clear
link between words and actions was an important factor in several of the
precedent cases.
To meet the goal of preventing genocide, the proposed framework
ideally would be used at an early enough stage to ask not whether massa-
cres already were taking place, but rather whether overt acts were taking
place that could bridge the gap between incitement and genocide. Such
acts would be examined not to test the criminal intent of an inciter, but
rather to gauge the immediacy and degree of physical danger posed by the
inflammatory speech. Although it is beyond the scope of communication
research and this Article to propose specific guidelines for this criterion, it
seems reasonable that overt acts would gain weight where taken on a large
scale, such as the stockpiling of weapons, or where taken against a target
group that was particularly vulnerable, for example because of its minority
status or the unwillingness or inability of the government to protect target
group members.
IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE OF RWANDA, 1994
Had the proposed framework been applied to the broadcasts of
RTLM, the international community would have had the strongest possible
case for disrupting the radio signals. The facts surrounding the RTLM
broadcasts would signal extreme danger in response to every element of
the framework, justifying international intervention. An analysis of the
Rwandan situation follows, applying each factor of the proposed frame-
work.
154. Id. 4.3.
155. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T 1 995 (quoting Incal v. Turkey, App. No. 22678/93, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 51 (1998), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en
(search Incal v. Turkey in "Case Title" field)).
156. Jersild v. Denmark, App. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993) (Commission report), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search Jersild v. Denmark in "Case Title"
field of HUDOC Collection and select second result-Commission (Plenary)) (Mr. Gaukur
Jolrundsson, dissenting).
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A. Media Environment
The Rwandan media environment was dangerous. Illiteracy rates were
high,' so radio broadcasts in Kinyarwanda, the indigenous language,
were the only meaningful mass media in rural villages.58 This limited
listeners' access to any competing messages.159 Additional factors also
restricted the range of voices in the media. As RTLM hired away journal-
ists and announcers, some competing media outlets ended publication. 160
After issuing RTLM's radio license, the government "denied licenses to
... other applicants." 16 1 From 1990-1994, several journalists were ar-
rested, intimidated, and killed after publishing articles against the govern-
ment. 162 RTLM, relayed across the country on transmitters owned by the
government, 16 3 had no serious competition from the other two Kinyarwan-
da-language stations. Although the station objected at trial that it had in-
cluded opposition views on its airwaves, the ICTR found that the tone of
these rare broadcasts only held the Tutsi up to further contempt. " Over-
all, RTLM was more entertaining than both the staid broadcasts of the
government's Radio Rwanda1 65 and the amateurish propaganda of the rebel
radio station, Radio Muhabura. 166 Furthermore, the debut of RTLM in
157. PRUNIER, supra note 4, at 133 ("In a country like Rwanda where more than 60% of the popu-
lation could not read or write, the existence of a free press only had meaning for the literate sector of
the population, who were already politically aware anyway. The audiovisual scene was a tremendously
important battlefield and here the government still reigned supreme: its version of events was the one
carried out to the hilly countryside by radio. The license given to 'free' extremist radio RTLMC (and
to nobody else who might have supported a more moderate line) only made things worse.").
158. Christine L. Kellow & H. Leslie Steeves, The Role of Radio in the Rwandan Genocide, J. OF
COMM., Sept. 1998, at 107, 117.
159. BBC broadcasts in Rwanda, for example, were in English.
160. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 118.
161. See Kevin W. Goering, Damion K. L. Stodola & John C. Knapp, Why U.S. Law Should Have
Been Considered in the Rwanda Media Convictions, COMM. L. 12, Spring 2004, at 10, 12 (citing Dina
Temple-Raston, Three Rwandan Media Executives Are on Trial for Inciting Genocide. Their Case -
the First of Its Kind Since Nuremburg - Will Pressure International Courts to Crack Down on Free
Speech, LEGAL AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 29). Goering et al. write that, given the lack of a market-
place of ideas to counter RTLM, even U.S. free speech doctrines would not have protected the defen-
dants from conviction for incitement. Id.
162. Jean Marie Kamatali, Freedom of Expression and Its Limitations: The Case of the Rwandan
Genocide, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 66 (2002).
163. Morand Fachot, Survey of "Hate" and "Humanitarian" Broadcast Media Operating in Zones
of Conflict (Apr. 30, 2000),
http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/0/c584cdc24a63e9e6cl2568e400 5f1463?OpenDocument.
164. Gordon, supra note 43, at 176 n.214.
165. Radio Rwanda did add to the fearful atmosphere by accusing the RPF of "an ideology of
'ethnic purification."' Bill Berkeley, Sounds of Violence, NEW REPUBLIC 211, Aug. 22, 1994, at 18
(quoting a March 31, 1994, transcript compiled by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda).
166. ARTICLE 19, BROADCASTING GENOCIDE: CENSORSHIP, PROPAGANDA & STATE-SPONSORED
VIOLENCE IN RWANDA 1990-1994, 49 (1996), http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/rwanda-
broadcasting-genocide.pdf [hereinafter ARTICLE 19]. Radio Muhabura did not call on listeners to kill,
however. Interview with Paul Rusesabagina, former manager of the Hotel Milles Collines, in Pough-
keepsie, N.Y. (Apr. 27, 2005).
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1993 had been promoted in the popular, inflammatory newspaper Kangu-
ra, 167 and RTLM journalists, in turn, unfailingly commented on Kangura's
articles. 168 Several witnesses testified to hearing the same information
emanating from both media, 169 an echo that could heighten audience accep-
tance of RTLM's framing of reality. As the killing began, RTLM's con-
trol of the Rwandan media environment expanded, eliminating other
sources of information: telephone lines were cut, roadblocks were set up
to stop internal movement, and foreign journalists were expelled. 170 Final-
ly, RTLM used its on-air influence to discredit opposing views, repeatedly
telling listeners to ignore any conflicting accounts of events.171 Of course,
the genocide itself silenced potential opposing voices.
B. Political Context
The political context of the RTLM broadcasts was dangerously unsta-
ble, a second indication of the potential for incitement. 17 2 The late 1980s
had been marked by economic decline in Rwanda. In 1990, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), consisting of Tutsis who had been exiled in Uganda
since Rwandan independence, attempted to invade the country. Over the
following three years, they gained control of a sliver of land along the
Ugandan border. The RPF signed a peace accord with the government of
President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1993, but in the meantime, the Rwan-
dan army had vastly expanded. Weapons had flooded into the country, and
anti-Tutsi extremists had mobilized an armed youth wing. When an air-
plane carrying the president crashed on April 6, 1994, the news was
shocking. RTLM broadcasts blamed the rebels and used the uncertain po-
litical environment to signal the start of the killing by calling on the Hutu
majority to destroy the rebels and other Tutsi. 17 3
C. Characteristics of the Audience
The audience of RTLM was ideal for manipulation. Although listeners
were so varied as to include even Tutsi rebel leaders, 174 the disc jockeys'
167. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1932 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/
Judg&sent.pdf.
168. Id. 933.
169. Id. 935.
170. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 123.
171. Id. at 119.
172. See generally id.
173. PRUNIER, supra note 4, at 224. Radio Rwanda blurred any line between rebel soldiers and
civilians by reporting that RPF members often changed their clothes, "trying to be confused with
ordinary people who till the soil and go to the market." Berkeley, supra note 165, at 19 (quoting a
May 23, 1994, transcript).
174. ARTICLE 19, supra note 166, at 49 ("Sources close to the RPF [the Tutsi-led rebel Rwandan
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irreverence and crude tone especially appealed to disaffected youth. 175
RTLM had built a large following by offering popular music and obscene
jokes, 176 upbeat disc jockeys,177 Rwanda's first call-in program, 178 and
blunt talk. Most listeners were unemployed. 17 9 They belonged to large
social networks that identified primarily according to religion and tribal
membership. To the extent that Hutu listeners had felt wronged or op-
pressed by Tutsis, the RTLM audience was already sympathetic to a mes-
sage that portrayed the Tutsi as a looming threat. Moreover, audience
members came from a strong tradition of deference to authority and gen-
erally responded to directives according to a norm of rote obedience."so
D. Authority of the Source
RTLM had authority over listeners. Although it was not the official
government station, RTLM was supported by Rwanda's "ruling inner cir-
cle," including the wife of President Habyarimana.181 It had the coopera-
tion of the government station, and eventually it used Radio Rwanda's
transmitters and airwaves to reach all of the country. 182 As the ICTR
noted, free speech claims are typically brought to court by minorities or
opposition groups fighting suppression by governments. 183 In Rwanda,
however, the broadcast speech in question represented the majority popu-
lation, 184 and it coincided with its Hutu-power movement, aimed against
the minority group.
Patriotic Front] claim that RTLM was extremely popular with the rebel soldiers .... Even Alexis
Kanyarengwe, RPF President, is reported to have been an avid listener and, before the genocide, is
said to have found the station very amusing.").
175. ARTICLE 19, supra note 166, at 50 (citing an interview with G6rard Prunier: "RTLM was
geared to people on street corners - if it was beamed to peasants, it was for the young ones. Their
parents would have disapproved. It was for 20-year-olds and under..... RTLM's target was gangs,
young thugs.").
176. PRUNIER, supra note 4, at 189.
177. Francis Rolt, More Media, Not More News, CONFLICT PREVENTION NEWSL. (Eur. Platform
for Conflict Prevention & Transformation), May 2003, at 14.
178. Internews, Media in Conflict: Case Study-Rwanda, http://www.intemews.org/pubs/mediain
conflict/mic rwanda.shtm. For a description of early broadcasts and their appeal to Rwandan au-
diences, see DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, JUSTICE ON THE GRASS 2-3 (Free Press 2005).
179. Kamatali, supra note 162, at 69.
180. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 116.
181. Id. at 117-18.
182. Id. at 118.
183. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1 1008 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement
/Judg&sent.pdf.
184. Id.
The dangers of censorship have often been associated in particular with the suppression of
political or other minorities, or opposition to the government. The special protections de-
veloped by the jurisprudence for speech of this kind, in international law and more particu-
larly in the American legal tradition of free speech, recognize the power dynamic inherent
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E. Content of the Message
The content of RTLM broadcasts incited genocide directly and indi-
rectly, both in words and in tone. RTLM did not offer factual news re-
ports"' but instead repeated anti-Tutsi messages portraying the Tutsi as
inherently evill86 and as enemies of the state by virtue of their ethnicity
alone.187 Following well established propaganda techniques, RTLM placed
all Tutsi (as well as moderate Hutu) into one category... and dehumanized
them, referring to the Tutsi as inyenzi, or cockroaches.189 This ethnic ste-
reotyping promoted contempt and hatred for Tutsi.190 RTLM warned lis-
teners that the Tutsi minority planned to take over the land of the Hutu
majority.191 It claimed that the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a
rebel group that was engaged in peace talks with the government, actually
planned to dominate the country, just as Tutsis had during Belgian colonial
rule."* RTLM directed the audience to kill and gave instructions on how
to do it.193 Broadcasts directed specific audiences to attack at specific loca-
tions.194
In addition, RTLM's emotional content heightened its effectiveness.
From its first broadcast, on July 8, 1993,195 RTLM associated its broad-
casts with the pleasure of hearing popular African music. 196 The fast-
paced, urgent content of the RTLM messages was emotionally arousing.1 97
RTLM's messages seemed realistic, although the station falsely reported
atrocities committed by Tutsis. 198 Its themes were repeated and also were
in the circumstances that make minority groups and political opposition vulnerable to the
exercise of power by the majority or by the government.
Id.
185. Id. 949.
186. Id. 963.
187. Id. 969.
188. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 121.
189. Id. at 120 (citing AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR, AND DEFIANCE (1995)). The
word inyenzi had also been applied to Tutsi guerrillas during the years immediately following Rwan-
dan independence from Belgium. PRUNIER, supra note 4, at 54.
190. "[T]he reason we will exterminate them is that they belong to one ethnic group." Nahimana,
Case No. ICTR 99-52-T 1 396.
191. TEMPLE-RASTON, supra note 178, at 50.
192. Id.
193. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 107. Kellow and Steeves write that the instructional
steps were portrayed as detailed accounts of alleged Tutsi aggression. They cite the example of a May
20, 1994, broadcast, which reported Tutsi to be "gathering guns, killing Hum families and burning
down their houses." Id. at 120.
194. Id. at 121. It is worth noting, however, that Kellow and Steeves found no support for the
common reports, including the ICTR's assertion, that RTLM broadcast the names of individuals tar-
geted for killing, although some people were identified in indirect ways, which were understood by the
audience. Id. at 121-22 (citing Berkeley, supra note 165, at 18).
195. ARTICLE 19, supra note 166, at 41.
196. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 118.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 120.
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echoed in other inciting media.199 Once the killing began, the lurid mes-
sages abandoned the most fundamental norms.2 0
F. Channel of Communication
RTLM used the channel of communication that was the most powerful
in Rwanda. Radio remains a powerful medium there and throughout most
of Africa, where it has been described as the continent's "central nervous
system."20 1 In Rwanda, radio use had grown rapidly over the course of 20
years. In 1970, there had been just one radio receiver per 120 people. By
1990, the ratio was one radio receiver per 13 people.202 Radios, bought
during the 1980s with foreign aid funds and distributed for free during
election campaigns,203 penetrated into even remote villages.204 Culturally,
radio has been described as a continuation of Africa's oral tradition.205 In
Africa, it still offers millions of people an inexpensive way to overcome
such communication barriers as illiteracy and a lack of transportation for
newspaper delivery.20 6 It also provides African leaders with "'a kind of
political megaphone. '207 Furthermore, radio is an intimate medium, ac-
companying listeners in their daily activities, joining speaker and listeners
in a moment in time. 208 Radio has the power to draw on a listener's expe-
rience and imagination to create vivid pictures of events-even events
which have not, in fact, occurred.209
199. ARTICLE 19, supra note 166, at 53-59. A leading example was Kangura, the newspaper of the
third media official to be convicted of incitement by the ICTR. ARTICLE 19, supra note 166, at 53-59.
200. PRUNIER, supra note 4, at 189. ("[P]eople went on listening to it with a kind of stupefied
fascination, incredulous at the relaxed joking way in which it defied the most deeply cherished human
values. The fascination extended to the RPF fighters in the battle .... .").
201. John Balzar, The Power ofAfrica's Airwaves, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1995, at Al.
[O]n a continent that is crushingly poor, undereducated, rural and remote, only radio can
truly be called the medium for the masses.
Radio also is power, an extension of Africa's oral tradition in which each important idea is
amplified dozens of times over by vilage chitchat and campfire gatherings.
And that's why a mud-hut peasant family buys batteries before it buys shoes.
Id.
202. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 115 (citing JEAN-PIERRE CHRETIEN, RWANDA: LES
MtDIAS Du GENOCIDE 57 (1995)).
203. Frank Chalk, Radio Propaganda and Genocide (Montreal Inst. for Genocide & Human Rights
Studies Occasional Paper, 1999), http://migs.concordia.ca/occpapers/radio_pr.html.
204. PRUNIER, supra note 4, at 133.
205. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 115.
206. Id. at 116.
207. Id. at 115 (quoting LOUISE MANON BOURGALT, MASS MEDIA IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 80
(1995)).
208. See, e.g., MCLUHAN, supra note 65, at 327 ("The subliminal depths of radio are charged with
the resonating echoes of tribal horns and antique drums. This is inherent in the very nature of this
medium, with its power to turn the psyche and society into a single echo chamber.").
209. Kellow & Steeves, supra note 158, at 109 (citing HADLEY CANTRIL, ET AL., THE INVASION
FROM MARS vii (1940) (describing Orson Welles' famous October 30, 1938, War of the Worlds radio
broadcast, which frightened more than one million listeners, out of an audience of six million, with
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G. Overt Act
Additional acts linking incitement to killing were evident in Rwanda
before the genocide. Private militias were being created, trained, and
armed in the years between 1990 and 1994.210 Violent attacks occurred
repeatedly, first against small minority communities 211 and then against
Tutsi.2 12 In 1992, a Rwandan human rights publication reported that more
than two dozen members of the president's circle were involved in death
squads.2 13 Amnesty International reported that 2,300 people had already
been killed before the president's plane crashed.2 14 Within days after the
crash, the New York Times reported "'tens of thousands' of deaths.'"215 By
May of 1994, United States officials realized that civilians were being
killed systematically.216 The ICTR, in convicting Nahimana of incitement,
found it significant that his expression of happiness about "awakening the
majority people" took place on April 25, 1994, "while the genocide was
underway; the massacre of the Tutsi population was ongoing. "217
V. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The inadequacy of current international law to identify incitement to
genocide has been illustrated by supposing a hypothetical speaker in New
York City's Times Square shouting "any of the most explicit rants that
were broadcast over Rwandan radio. "218 Such a speaker could have the
realistic news reports that Martians had invaded New Jersey)).
210. CHRISTIAN P. SCHERRER, GENOCIDE AND CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA: CONFLICT ROOTS,
MASS VIOLENCE, AND REGIONAL WAR 79-81 (Praeger 2002).
211. Id. at 23. Scherrer lists attacks beginning in 1990 against Hima and Gogwe ethnic minority
communities. Id.
212. Id. at 69 ("Pogroms against the Tutsi began again in March 1992 in the Bugesera regions of
Kigali prefecture. These pogroms were viewed as the final rehearsal for the genocide.").
213. Rick Orth, Four Variables in Preventive Diplomacy: Their Application in the Rwanda Case, J.
CONFLICT STUD., Spring 1997,
http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=SPR97/articles/& filename=orth.html.
214. Id. (citing Alan Rake, Operation Genocide, NEW AFRICAN, July-Aug. 1994, at 12, 13).
215. Jeff Jacoby, Commentary: Our Indifference to Rwanda Genocide, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30,
2001, at A19. The New York Times also described "'bodies littering the streets and, outside the main
hospital, a pile of corpses six feet high."' Id.
216. A May 9, 1994 report by the Defense Intelligence Agency read,
Multiple sources indicate that the violence by the Presidential Guard and various youth mi-
litias was not spontaneous but was directed by high-level officials within the interim gov-
ernment ....
It appears that in addition to random massacres of Tutsis . . . there is an organized, parallel
effort of genocide being implemented by the army ....
Glenda Cooper, Memos Reveal Rwanda Delay: U.S. Had Early Notice of Genocide; Pentagon Re-
jected Action, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2001, at A20.
217. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgment and
Sentence, 1974 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement
/Judg&sent.pdf.
218. Benesch, supra note 18, at 494.
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required content-and intent-for conviction under international law but
still would pose no real risk.
Applying the proposed framework would distinguish this speech from
a real incitement to genocide that would justify intervention. (A) The me-
dia environment in Times Square could hardly be more diverse, with
competing messages emanating from newsstands, billboards, conversa-
tions, broadcasts, and even rants on other corners. (B) The larger political
context is stable. (C) The audience, consisting of ethnically diverse listen-
ers in a highly individualistic culture, already hardened to impromptu
speeches, would be unlikely candidates for action. (D) The speaker, pre-
sumably unknown to the crowd, would have no authority. (E) The weak
channel of communication-voice-would reach only a relatively small
number of listeners. At this point, no matter what the speaker said or what
he planned, the framework would not justify international intervention.
By contrast, an argument for international intervention might be im-
agined under extraordinary conditions in New York City, such as a hypo-
thetical variation on the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001. That event heightened the dependence of
New Yorkers on the news media.219 If the attack had also crippled the
news media, reducing the available voices to a handful, and if these com-
bined to immerse the audience in repeated, emotional directives by author-
itative speakers seeking to justify extermination of the city's Muslim mi-
nority, and if the audience members were networking along ethnic and
religious lines to plan attacks on Muslims, then outside intervention might
well be justified.220
It has been objected that any system of jamming radio broadcasts
might risk censoring less pointed content; for example, a soldier's solitary
remark directed against some group. 2 2 1 But again, the proposed framework
would not support prior restraint of harmless remarks. Under the frame-
work, even the broadcast of the soldier's remark could not legitimately be
jammed if the remark were broadcast to an audience with many other in-
formation sources or if it occurred in a time of political stability, where
there was no indication of real violence or plans for violence against the
target group. Justification for jamming would arise only with evidence (A)
that the soldier's statement filled the airwaves by repetition or by the eli-
mination of other sources of information, (B) that the soldier was speaking
during a time of political instability that heightened public dependence on
broadcasts, (C) that the audience members had sympathy for or were oth-
219. Lowery, supra note 56, at 40.
220. Under U.S. law, such speech would likely lose First Amendment protection since it would be
seen as a call to imminent lawless action and as likely to result in such action, satisfying the test of
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
221. Editorial: Don't Spread Jamming, supra note 26.
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erwise inclined to act upon the soldier's words, (D) that the channel of
communication was widespread and effective, (E) that the soldier had per-
suasive authority in the eyes of his audience, (F) that the content of his
message demonized all members of a group solely because of their mem-
bership in that group and called for their destruction, and (G) that prepara-
tion for killing members of the group was under way.
By contrast, had Julius Streicher been broadcasting rather than print-
ing in Germany, the framework would indicate conditions justifying inter-
vention, and-unlike his conviction at Nuremberg-the silencing of his
message would not depend on his knowledge of the killing of Jews in
Eastern Europe. To justify the censorship, the fact that killing was even
planned would have been enough.
Finally, under the framework, if Sudan's President Bashir were to use
the immediacy of radio and his authority over compliant Janjaweed militia
to urge extermination of specific ethnic groups, the international communi-
ty would be justified in interrupting the broadcasts, whether or not the
president's intent to commit genocide could be shown in a later criminal
proceeding.
VI. JAMMING BROADCASTS
Disrupting broadcast messages violates a foundational law of tele-
communications. 2 2 Radio is regulated internationally by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU),223 which became a U.N. specialized
agency following World War 11.224 It has authority to allocate bands of the
radio-frequency spectrum to the different nations and to promote the effi-
cient development of radio technology worldwide.225 The ITU constitution
prohibits harmful interference to radio signals of other states or recognized
broadcast agencies, whether from competing radio signals22 6 or other
"electrical apparatus."2
222. For a description of jamming techniques, see Alexander C. Dale, Note, Countering Hate
Messages That Lead to Violence: The United Nations's Chapter VII Authority to Use Radio Janrning
to Halt Incendiary Broadcasts, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109 (2001).
223. This body predates the United Nations, having been formed in 1865 to link telegraph systems
on the European Continent. From the start, its work was primarily technical. Its first conference
standardized Morse code and set a rate structure. JAMES G. SAVAGE, THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 10 (Westview 1989).
224. Id. at 38.
225. CONST. OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION art. 1 (Purposes of the Un-
ion).
226. CONST. OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION art. 45, 1 197 (requiring that
"[aIll stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to
cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Member States or of
recognized operating agencies .... ).
227. CONST. OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION art. 45, 1 199.
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This prohibition is far from absolute, however. Broadcast interference
has occurred since the 1930s,228 and it has taken a variety of forms,229 the
most common being one nation's blocking of international short wave
broadcasts from other nations.230 In 1948, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, in Article 19, articulated a "free flow norm"2 31 of interna-
tional telecommunications. It specified a right "to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. "232
Nevertheless, the ITU has refrained from censuring countries for blocking
incoming foreign broadcasts as long as the effect of jamming has been
limited to the country's own territory.233
Furthermore, in 1971, the ITU reversed its free-flow philosophy in the
area of a new television technology, direct-to-receiver broadcasting by
satellite (DBS). The Soviet Union and developing nations pressed to estab-
lish a duty on the part of a DBS broadcaster to limit its own reach, effec-
tively censoring itself, to avoid the "spillover" of its signal as much as
technically possible, into any country that had not agreed in advance to
allow the signal.234 The restriction, approved the following year as General
Assembly Resolution 2916, came to be known as the "Jammer's Char-
ter. "235
The free-flow principle also yielded in the late 1970s to developing
countries' concern about Northern Hemisphere dominance of information
on the international airwaves. Calling for a "new world information or-
der" (NWIO), the countries again emphasized the state sovereignty norm
over the free flow of information norm.236 The ITU responded to these
tensions between speech and sovereignty with a 1982 recommendation
incorporating elements of the developing nations' concerns. It portrayed
the mass media as contributing "'to strengthening peace and international
understanding, to the promotion of human rights and to countering ...
228. The first successful jamming is thought to have been used by Austria in 1934, to block out
Nazi propaganda. SAVAGE, supra note 223, at 138.
229. Interference in the free flow of radio signals can employ technology in unusual ways or can
avoid technology completely. In Southern Africa in the 1960s, domestic radio stations switched to FM
in order to attract audiences to the FM band, where signals travel shorter distances and are therefore
more controllable locally. This was meant to reduce the impact of foreign programs, which arrived on
the longer-distance AM band. In Albania and North Korea, listening to international broadcasts is
against the law, as it was in Nazi Germany and occupied territories. SAVAGE, supra note 223, at 133.
230. This form was particularly prevalent in the early 1980s as the then-Soviet Union continuously
jammed Western broadcasts. SAVAGE, supra note 223, at 135. See also Monroe Price, Public Diplo-
macy and the Transformation of International Broadcasting, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 51, 56
(2003).
231. SAVAGE, supra note 223.
232. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 75 (1948).
233. SAVAGE, supra note 223, at 157.
234. Id. at 148.
235. The vote was by a 102-1 margin, with seven abstentions. The opposing vote was the United
States. SAVAGE, supra note 223, at 149-50.
236. Id. at 155.
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incitement to war. '237 These deviations from the free-flow principle illu-
strate that international broadcasting norms are not unequivocal. Broadcast
jamming has been allowed, at least tacitly, in service to other international
interests, including the Cold War security concerns of the Soviet Union
and the cultural preservation interests of developing nations.
The question of jamming broadcast signals within another state in or-
der to prevent genocide is unlike the previous debates, however, because
such jamming would violate both of the international norms that were pre-
viously at odds. To jam a nation's own signal-rather than a foreign sig-
nal-is to disrupt the free flow of broadcasting while also infringing on
national sovereignty. Still, where large scale loss of life is at risk, even
outside action to override a nation's internal transmissions may find legal
basis.
The Genocide Convention empowers states to bring their concerns to
the U.N. Security Council. 238 An intervention into a nation by the Security
Council would be prima facie legal.239 In addition, some scholars argue
that the norm of sovereignty is not absolute240 and that there is support for
some kinds of intervention by other international or regional organizations
of states,241 pointing out that collective action has been endorsed in cases
of genocide, among other crises.22 Individual intervention by a neighbor-
ing state may be legitimate under a "protective principle,"24 3 as that state
attempts to avert a flood of refugees coming across the border.244 One
scholar even proposes that if faced with convincing evidence of genocide
in the future, states need not refrain from jamming inciting broadcasts
since judicious action may be exactly the step needed to further the devel-
opment of international intervention norms.245
237. Id. (internal citation omitted).
238. Genocide Convention, supra note 29, at art. 8.
239. Blinderman, supra note 9, at 125.
240. David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International
Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict 31 (Inst. on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper
No. 20, 1996), available at http://igcc.ucsd.edulpdf/policypapers/pp20.pdf. ("The principle of sove-
reignty has never been articulated or respected in the clear-cut manner often assumed by scholars of
international relations.").
241. Id. at 38.
242. Id. at 31 (quoting ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL
CONFLICTS 12 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., Council on Foreign Relations 1993)).
243. See Gregory S. Gordon, From Incitement to Indictment? Prosecuting Iran's President for
Advocating Israel's Destruction and Piecing Together Incitement Law's Emerging Analytical Frame-
work, 98 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 853, 893 (2007) (discussing, in a criminal prosecution context,
several theories for international response to public statements by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahma-
dinejad).
244. More than one million Rwandan Hutu are reported to have fled to Congo. Kisangani N. F.
Emizet, The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A Case of U.N. Peacekeeping Failure and International
Law, 38 J. OF MODERN AFR. STUD. 163, 163 (2000). Another million or more fled to Tanzania.
Charles David Smith, The Geopolitics of Rwandan Resettlement: Uganda and Tanzania, 23 ISSUE: A J.
OF OPINION 54, 54 (1995).
245. Blinderman, supra note 9, at 125-26. ("Law is sometimes subject to modification. As cir-
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Moreover, sovereign states do not own the airwaves. The ITU defines
the spectrum of broadcast frequencies as a nonterritorial "common herit-
age resource," preserved for the entire world and required to be used for
peace.246 The ITU did not involve itself in the Rwandan genocide, howev-
er. As a rule, for reasons of both mission and organizational personality,247
the ITU focuses not on broadcast content, but on technical advancement,
on the belief that telecommunication is increasingly important for "the
preservation of peace and the economic and social development of all
States." 248 The ITU addressed the use of radio in Rwanda only in its tech-
nical sense: ITU Resolution 34 granted special assistance to rebuild the
telecommunication network after the genocide.249 Still, the founding values
of the ITU offer another legal theory for disruption of genocide-inciting
broadcasts: The ITU constitution requires that international services give
"absolute priority" to telecommunication related to saving lives, in cases
ranging from maritime emergencies to urgent epidemiological messages.2
It also requires radio stations to accept and reply to distress calls and to
take action as required in response? In January 2005, the lifesaving
priority of broadcasting was reinforced with the ratification of the Tam-
pere Convention on Emergency Telecommunications.252 The treaty calls
on states to streamline access to broadcast frequencies during emergency
situations for a defined group of humanitarian agencies. 5 3
An argument for jamming broadcasts that incite genocide seems clear:
Genocide, the "crime of crimes,"2 warrants exceptional treatment. Since
genocide usually does not occur without the involvement, or at least the
complicity, of a government,255 it will be extremely rare for a sovereign
state to prevent genocide within its own borders. Therefore, the Genocide
cumstances change and indicate that pre-existing rules are no longer capable of coping with existing
challenges, new norms must be formulated .... ).
246. The ITU views the spectrum as having the same attributes as the ocean floor: "1. Such areas
are not subject to appropriation by states; 2. All states must share in the management of them; 3.
There must be an active sharing of the benefits reaped from the exploitation of their resources; and 4.
The areas must be dedicated exclusively to peaceful purposes." SAVAGE, supra note 223, at 20-21.
247. Id. at 16. ("[Dlelegates to [world administrative radio conferences] ... tend to be skilled
technicians who are averse to talking about issues of equitability in telecommunication use or greater
non-technical principles of 'justice' or 'democratization."').
248. CONST. OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, preamble.
249. ITU Res. 34, Oct. 30, 2008 ("Assistance and support to Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda and Soma-
lia for rebuilding their telecommunication networks").
250. CONST. OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, art. 40.
251. CONST. OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, art. 46.
252. Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitiga-
tion and Relief Operations, June 18, 1998 2296 U.N.T.S. 5.
253. Id.
254. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 1 16 (Sept. 4,
1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm (follow "Cases" link, follow "Status of Cases"
link, and follow "KAMBANDA, Jean (ICTR-97-23)" link).
255. See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Genocide, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
541, 541(Peter McCalister-Smith, ed., 1995).
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Convention's requirement that states prevent genocide will be virtually
meaningless without the possibility of international action. Genocide in-
volving public participation requires mass communication in order to
coordinate its machinery. 56 Where that communication takes place on the
broadcast airwaves, the international community has a potential avenue of
preventive action" that is less coercive than armed intervention.258
CONCLUSION
Definitions of incitement to genocide have aimed primarily at convict-
ing criminals after they already have stirred audiences to kill. Such defini-
tions do not enable the international community to identify which messag-
es may legally be blocked before genocide begins. To answer the latter
question, this Article has drawn on communication research, which offers
empirical findings as to which factors make media messages powerful
enough to mobilize audiences. This Article has proposed a framework of
seven factors that can be used to determine when media messages consti-
tute incitement to genocide and may legally be disrupted.
The framework is a systematic inquiry. It would look first at external-
ly observable factors that can heighten the impact of a media message. It
would assess (A) whether the media environment limits competing mes-
sages and repeats a suspect message so as to immerse the audience in it;
(B) whether the political context in the region is unstable, thereby heigh-
tening audience dependence on media messages; and (C) whether the au-
dience is particularly vulnerable to messages of incitement, considering
such factors as whether it is unsophisticated, volatile, or highly networked
along such lines as ethnicity and religion. Where these factors indicate a
high degree of danger, the framework would examine (D) whether the
source of the message is authoritative in the eyes of the audience and (E)
whether the content of the message calls for killing and justifies it by de-
256. See Susan Benesch, Inciting Genocide, Pleading Free Speech, WORLD POL'Y J., Summer
2004, at 62, 64. See also Schabas, supra note 2, at 171. ("A well-read and well-informed genocidaire
will know that at the early stages of planning of the 'crime of crimes', [sic] his or her money is best
spent not in purchasing machetes, or Kalatchnikovs, or Zyklon B gas, but rather investing in radio
transmitters and photocopy machines.").
257. Jamming a radio station may not be easy, however. Jamming of FM broadcasts requires
producing signals locally, through nearby transmitters or aircraft. Thus, it requires the cooperation of
local or neighboring authorities in addition to electric power or aircraft. It may also require forces to
protect the operation from attack. Radio Netherlands Media Network, Reacting to Hate Radio (Jan. 8,
2004), http://www.rnw.nl/realradio/dossiers/html/intervention.html. Jamming may not always be
successful. In August of 1994, after the defeat of the Hutu-dominated government ended the Rwandan
genocide, spy satellites of the U.S. National Security Agency reportedly tried unsuccessfully to find a
propaganda radio station that apparently was still broadcasting sporadically from some mobile plat-
form, perhaps on a truck. Paul Quinn-Judge, U.S. Tries to Find Rwanda Radio: Bid to Mute Ousted
Government, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1994, at 2.
258. Blinderman, supra note 9, at 126.
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humanizing the target group or warning that the target group poses an
imminent threat. The framework would also consider whether the content
of the message is enjoyable or highly emotional or exhibits other traits
shown to enhance its power. The framework would assess (F) to what
degree the channel of communication being used is immediate and power-
ful. Additionally, the proposed framework would consider (G) whether
overt acts toward killing are under way.
The proposed framework, if applied to the RTLM broadcasts, would
have permitted international intervention. RTLM dominated a media envi-
ronment that was extremely limited, where repetition immersed the au-
dience in its messages. The political context was highly unstable, heighten-
ing audience dependence on the radio. The audience was largely young
and unemployed, angry and malleable. In that volatile atmosphere, an au-
thoritative source transmitted classic propaganda messages, combined with
highly emotional content, through the country's most powerful channel of
communication. Finally, preparation for killing was under way.
Once identified, a broadcast incitement to genocide could be disrupted
legally under several theories. Among them is that the constitution of the
International Telecommunications Union gives "absolute priority" on the
broadcast airwaves to telecommunications related to saving lives.
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